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Aesthetic Value: Beauty, Ugliness and 
Incoherence 
MA T T H EW  K I E R AN  
I: Beauty and Aesthetic Value 
From Plato through Aquinas to Kant and beyond beauty has tradi- 
tionally been considered the paradigmatic aesthetic quality. Thus, 
quite naturally following Socrates' strategy in The Meno, we are 
tempted to generalize from our analysis of the nature and value of 
beauty, a particular aesthetic value, to an account of aesthetic value 
generally. When we look at that which is beautiful, the object gives 
rise to a certain kind of pleasure within us. Thus  aesthetic value is 
characterized in terms of that which affords us pleasure. Of course, 
the relation cannot be merely instrumental. Many activities may 
lead to consequent pleasures that we would not consider to be aes- 
thetic in any way. For example, playing tennis, going swimming or 
finishing a book. Rather it is in the very contemplation of the object 
itself that we derive pleasure. As Kant puts it: 
IVe dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful because this con- 
templation strengthens and reproduces itself. The  case is analo- 
gous (but analogous only) to the way we linger on a charm in the 
representation of an object which keeps arresting the attention, 
the mind all the while remaining passive.' 
Thus contemporary philosophers have, following this tradition, 
defined aesthetic value in terms of our delighting in and savouring 
an object with pleasure.* An object is of intrinsic aesthetic value if 
it appropriately gives rise to pleasure in our contemplation of it. Of 
course background knowledge of particular art movements, cate- 
gories or artistic intentions may be required to perceive an artwork 
appropriately. Nonetheless, given the relevant understanding, it is 
' Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. J .  C.  Meredith, 
(Oxford 'niversity Press, 1951), Book I ,  Section 12, p. 64. 
* See, for example, Kendall Walton, 'How Marvellous! Toward a 
Theory of Aesthetic Value', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 
5 1,  No. 3, pp. 499-510, Malcolm Budd, Values of Art, (London: Penguin, 
1995), pp. 1-44, and Jerrold Levinson, 'Pleasure, Aesthetic' in David 
Cooper (ed.), A Compatriot to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwells, 1992), pp. 
330-335. 
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in attending to and savouring uhat  is presented to us that we are 
afforded pleasure. 
Of course, we may delight in many things that are presented to us 
which are not beautiful, such as the comic and the tragic, which we 
still wish to characterize as aesthetic. \Ve cannot, of course, say they 
are aesthetic by virtue of the pleasure deriving from their beaut): 
For often what is tragic or comic is far from beautiful at all. Hence 
if we are to grasp the essence of aesthetic value, we need a more 
general characterization. The  standard move is to use the same form 
of explanation, where beauty mas taken as the paradigmatic aes- 
the t~c  qualit?; to derive a general account of aesthetic value. The  
classic account given by Beardsley locates aesthetic value, in quali- 
ties which vary from the beautiful to the comic or tragic, in the for- 
mal unit?; complexity and intensity of an object's formal and cog- 
nitive features.' \l.'hat unites all the various aesthetic qualities is the 
peculiar delight me take in the development of a theme, the elegance 
of the representation and so on. Thus,  it is thought, Lve can use the 
characterization of aesthetic value to generate general principles of 
aesthetic evaluation. T h e  core thought is that what we take delight 
in is itself delightful, in terms of unit?; harmon); coherent structure 
and complex development. 
11: Counter-Examples 
However, this standard picture of aesthetic value seems far from 
adequate if we consider the folloxving kinds of cases. Firstly, con- 
sider the case of punk. I take ~t that the whole point of punk, incor- 
porating both music and fashion, was to achieve both maximal ugli- 
ness and incoherence. The  point of putting studs or safety pins 
through noses, dying scruff\; unkempt hair in gar~sh colours, dress- 
ing up in black bin bags, tartan zipped trousers and slashed T-shirts 
was precisely to achieve an incoherent, ugly look. This was, in part, 
in contra-distinction to the highly stylized, slick and formal empha- 
sis on elegance that was taken to be predominant at the time. 
Similarly the use of discordance, guitar feedback and yelling stood 
in stark contrast to the overblom n, overproduced formalit~es of con- 
cept rock and the smooth, polished rhythms and harmonies of 
disco. If one searches for the qualities of coherence or complexitj- 
in punk music one is not onll- likely to be disappointed but be In for 
' iLIonroe Beardsley, Aesthetrcs (Yen  Tork: Harcourt, Brace and Fl'orld, 
1958), S e c t ~ on  24, pp. 456-470, and AIonroe Beards le~ , 'On T h e  
Genera l~ty  of Cr~t ica l  Reasons', Journal of Philosophy, Yol. LIX, So .  18, 
1962, pp. 477-186. 
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a very painful and unpleasant experience. Which is why many peo- 
ple find it unintelligible that anyone should like punk at all. But if 
someone looks for and savours the sheer brute ugliness and inco- 
herence of it all, then they will derive pleasure from it. An analo- 
gous example in the case of classical music is the work of composers 
like Stockhausen and John Cage. The  point of their music lies in 
contra-distinction to the setting up and development of themes and 
harmonies that typified classical music heretofore. 
I t  is also important to note that the positive evaluation of quali- 
ties such as ugliness and incoherence are not confined to the sphere 
of music or the transitory zeitgeist of fashion. In visual art there is 
a long tradition of the rendering of grotesques, both real and imag- 
inary; one only has to think of late Michelangelo, the late 
Renaissance generally, Francis Bacon or Andreas Serrano. I t  seems 
that we do derive a peculiar delight from the portrayal of distorted 
physiognomies or the rendering of grotesques. Indeed, many art- 
works not only involve distinctly repulsive emotions, thoughts and 
depictions but use repellant materials as well. So even though an 
artwork may be constituted from repugnant materials, depict per- 
verse scenes or people, we may be afforded pleasure by attending to 
them rather than being repelled by them. One reason for this might 
be that alluded to by John Constable: 
There is nothing ugly; I never saw an ugly thing in my life: for let 
the form of an object be what it may,-light, shade, and perspec- 
tive will always make it beautiful.' 
Subject matter we would ordinarily find disgusting might afford 
pleasure if it is artistically manipulated in a certain way and we are 
constrained to regard it in a certain light. The  peculiar orange 
medium bathing the crucifix in Andreas Serrano's Piss Christ con-
stitutes a peculiarly pleasing, luminous light if looked at indepen- 
dently of the material's associations. Thus  the contribution of 
materials we would normally consider repugnant, such as various 
bodily fluids, may constitute valuable features of an artwork. 
But it is crucial to recognize that the appeal of such works lies not 
merely in the way the subjects are rendered but in the very grotes- 
query of the image itself. The  high degree of unpleasantness 
involved often seems central to some artworks. We miss the entire 
point of Serrano's Piss Christ if we fail to realize what the medium 
is. The  very fact that the urine the crucifix is bathed in is high- 
lighted in the work's title ought to indicate its central relevance to 
the work. If we just looked at the luminous, aesthetically appealing 
' John Constable as quoted in C. R. Leslie, iVlemoirs of the life of John 
Constable (1873), Chapter 17. 
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liquid bathing the crucifix without knowledge of its constituent 
material, we would have missed the point of the work. For the 
work's point lies in the juxtaposition of the meaning and associa- 
tions of the medium used and the crucifix suspended in it. 
Consider, in a similar vein, the 1928 Buiiuel and Dali film Un 
Chien Andalou where several different parts are played by the same 
actor and actress, where the landscape outside the window changes 
arbitrarily from landscape one minute to cityscape the next and 
where the juxtaposition of surreal images and stark edits all con- 
tribute to the film's maximal incoherence. The  very point of the 
film is its lack of coherence, its opaqueness to attempts to analyse 
and make sense of it, whilst textured images such as the grotesque 
slitting of a donkey's eyeball continue to haunt the mind. 
The  point of these examples is that we, or at least some of us, 
seem to value in art images or music which are assumed to fall out- 
side the sphere of aesthetic value because they are ugly, grotesque or 
incoherent and that is their very point. True,  aesthetic theorists 
such as Beardsley may deny such works have any aesthetic value at 
all. But then this severely weakens the force of their claim to ha\,e 
captured the notion of aesthetic value, since many people clearly do 
value such qualities in artworks and, moreover, they are valued as 
such in many acclaimed masterpieces. Thus, Lve might be tempted 
to conclude, the typical picture of aesthetic value must be inade- 
quate. 
111: Cognitive Value 
One possible reply to such an objection is to claim that the examples 
cited are not really counter examples at all. For we must be careful 
to separate out cognitive value from aesthetic value. It seems clear 
that in art we value many different qualities, from the expressive to 
the cognitive, and not merely the aesthetic. It is crucial that we rec- 
ognize that artistic and aesthetic value are not co-extensive. A game 
of football or chess may have great aesthetic value, due to the sheer 
artistry and elegance of the players, yet we would hesitate to call 
such things artworks. Conversely, most conceptual art, Dada art- 
works or the music of John Cage and Stockhausen may almost 
entirely lack aesthetic value and yet clearly be considered artworks 
due to their expressive nature or cognitive content. In these cases 
even if the work does possess aesthetic value, this seems almost 
entirely incidental to the reasons we attend to and value them as art- 
works. 
Thus, it may be claimed, what xve value in the counter-examples 
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cited are not any putative aesthetic qualities but rather the cognitive 
attitudes represented or explored through them. For example, punk 
took off not merely as a reaction against the slick, stylized, heavily 
produced music of the time but as, in essence, an anti-establishment 
cult which aimed to tear down the supposed walls of snobbery, 
materialism and bourgeois aspirations. This is why, it might be said, 
many people do not and cannot enjoy punk music. For only if one 
takes punk as expressive of a certain attitude, and identifies with 
that attitude, will one derive any satisfaction from listening to, see- 
ing or being a punk. Just as in the fifties there was an angry young 
man syndrome underlying popular culture so too one might consid- 
er punk in the same light. For both in terms of fashion and music 
punk saw itself as standing against the values and aesthetics of tra- 
ditional British society. 
Indeed, the phrase anti-aesthetic used of such movements may be 
a telling one. For it seems plausible to hold that what is valued about 
punk is the underlying attitude rather than any intrinsic aesthetic 
merits possessed by the music. Similarly it might be said that the 
grotesqueries of late Michelangelo are valued because they express 
a disenchantment with the religious order of the world after the fall 
and sacking of Rome. Moreover grotesque, ugly and incoherent art- 
works may be valued by virtue of the way they enable us to explore 
our cognitive attitudes, beliefs and desires. So, in the case of a 
Francis Bacon, though horrifically ugly and repulsive, the work may 
have great appeal and artistic value because it enables us to confront 
and explore what it would be like if humanity were rotten, diseased, 
corrupted and distorted. Through engaging with such artworks we 
may learn and develop our cognitive understanding of what certain 
human possibilities would or could be like.' 
Our pleasure in such cases may arise from the provocation of cer- 
tain attitudes or our cognitive curiosity. Artworks or movements 
devoted to the grotesque or incoherent are concerned to provoke 
certain attitudes or explore our fascination with certain anomalies 
which violate our standard social and moral categories. Francis 
Bacon's creations violate the natural order, the way humanity 
appears to be, and for this very reason compels our curiosity, inter- 
est and thus attention. Yet, at the same time and for the same rea- 
sons, we find them aesthetically disgusting and repugnant. The  
abrogation of society's standard categories may be where both the 
fascination and aesthetic repugnance of such works lies. Therefore, 
though they lack aesthetic value, such works may be of great artis- 
tic value. 
j Noel Carroll makes a similar point about the value of horror films in 
his The Philosophy of Horror (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp 158-1 95. 
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So cognitive value may explain why we attend to intrinsically 
unpleasant things in art and value them as such. Furthermore, in 
engaging with artworks, we can afford to explore repulsive, 
grotesque and incoherent apparations and situations in a way we 
could not in the real world. For we cannot be threatened by an 
imaginary state of affairs in the way we could be if what we were 
imagining was actually happening. Hence kve may enjoy contem- 
plating the ugly or incoherent in art, a matter which might not so 
readily give rise to pleasure if the situation represented were part of 
our everyday world and constituted an actual threat to ourselves. 
After all, the threat of chaos and incoherence in our lives hardly 
gives rise to pleasurable delight. By contrast, in art we can experi- 
ence what sheer chaos, ugliness and brutality might be like, and per- 
haps what it would be appropriate to think and feel, without the 
potentially terrible cost which would follow in the real world. 
Therefore we can consider, provoke and satiate our curiosity about 
the grotesque, the ugly and the incoherent in art in ways we could 
or would not do in our everyday life. Perhaps then, by divorcing 
aesthetic from artistic value, such an account can completely explain 
why we value such artworks. 
Even as a psychological matter, it is often difficult for us to 
explore our curiosity about creatures, possibilities and events which 
challenge the way we categorize the world. This may be due to 
social taboos or real emotional and physical threats. However, in art 
these constraints fall away and we can provoke, extend and indulge 
our curiosity. So the cognitivist can claim to resolve the challenge to 
the traditional picture of aesthetic value. For he rejects the notion 
that we aesthetically value the disgusting, ugly or incoherent, whilst 
nonetheless recognizing their cognitive virtues in works of art. The  
unpleasant appearances, thoughts and feelings are conceived of as 
unfortunate by-products of the cognitive pay-off. If we are to 
explore the ideas, concepts and categorial violations which give rise 
to the value distinctive of such artworks, the unpleasant by-prod- 
ucts are unfortunate but necessary. Thus our interest in the ugly, 
incoherent or obscene lies in the curious violation of our social 
norms and conceptual framework. The  fact that they are aestheti- 
cally unpleasant and repel us is the price we must pay. 
Consider, in this light, the appeal of the Dada art movement. The  
use of and delight in radical artistic practices used to subvert 
attempts to impose sense upon art, literature and the world was 
associated with a radical political standpoint. The  reaction against 
figuration and artistic attempts to render the human world intelligi- 
ble suggests that Dada saw itself in direct opposition not merely to 
the artistic but, more generall?; to the broader political and social 
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status quo. Perhaps without the use of these radical techniques 
which fractured the audience's ability to make sense of what was 
going on, Dada would not have been able to question or stand 
against the way society was conceived to be. Thus  it is not that ugli- 
ness and incoherence are themselves intrinsically valuable in aes- 
thetic terms, but rather that under certain circumstances they can 
be used to make us confront and explore certain possibilities about 
our own society, possibilities we would not otherwise think about: 
T h e  word Dada symbolizes the most primitive relation to the 
reality of the environment; with Dadaism a new reality comes 
into its own. Life appears as a simultaneous muddle of noises, 
colours and spiritual rhythms, which is taken unmodified into 
Dadaist art, with all the sensational screams and fevers of its 
reckless everyday psyche and with all its brutal reality. This is the 
sharp dividing line separating Dadaism from all artistic direc- 
tions up until now ... Dadaism for the first time has ceased to take 
an aesthetic attitude toward life, and this it accomplishes by tear- 
ing all the slogans of ethics, culture and inwardness, which are 
merely cloaks for weak muscles, into their components." 
Indeed the whole point of foregrounding the construction of the 
artwork, in Dada, Brechtian theatre or nem wave French cinema, is 
to make us stop and think about the ways in which we can be lead 
into thinking certain institutions, social practices and structures are 
'natural' and therefore cannot be changed. Thus  the usually nega- 
tive value of incoherence can have a positive value when it is artis- 
tically used to get us to see things in a new light. One key means of 
doing so in twentieth century art clearly involves the fracturing of 
our experience of the work, thereby foregrounding the verj- ways in 
which we attempt to impose sense upon our norld. 
IV: The Appeal of the Grotesque 
Yet though the cognitivist's explanation is partially adequate it can- 
not prove wholly so. For what is left out of the cognitivist account 
is the actual delight we feel in attending to repellent, ugly and inco- 
herent artworks. I t  obviously makes sense to claim of a' Dada piece 
that it is just not incoherent enough, of a Stockhausen performance 
that it was just too harmonious or to say of a punk that he is just not 
as grotesque as he should be; and in all these cases we are disap- 
' Richard Hulsenbeck, 'First German Dada Alanifesto ("Collective 
Dada hlanifesto)"', pp. 254-255, in Charles Harrison and Paul LYood 
(eds),Art in Theory 1900-1 990 (Oxford: Blackwells, 1992). 
Matthew Kieran 
pointed. The  cognitivist equates these claims to the demand that 
they should explore more fully the relevant categorial violations. 
But the assimilation is a false one. 
Imagine Piss Christ had the same title but did not in fact use urine 
as its medium. Since we can treat the work as if constituted by urine 
this would hardly lessen the work's exploration of the divine as a 
being both of our human world and yet violating our standard cat- 
egories. Yet, for some at least, this would significantly diminish the 
force and appeal of the work itself. On the cognitivist account, Piss 
Christ would be a better art~vork with a different medium. Yet this 
is the exact opposite of what is the case. If the original medium was 
replaced then many would deem it to be of lesser value as art. This 
is precisely because we enjoy and value the uncomfortable oscilla- 
tion between the beauty of the image and the repulsive material it is 
actually constituted out of, independently of whether it extends our 
curiosity about the image violating our standard conceptualization 
of the world. 
Secondlq; the cognitivist's account works far better for our appre- 
ciation of Francis Bacon or Andreas Serrano than it does for ugly, 
brutal, chaotic images of war or grief. Whether a depiction of war 
or grief is valued as art does not seem to depend upon its violation 
of our categorial schemes at all. For example, the work of Goya, 
ugly) brutal tribal sculptures of various war gods, Picasso's Guernica 
or Weeping Woman seem, if anything, to confirm and extend, rather 
than abrogate, our understanding of violence, war or grief respec- 
tively. Thus Picasso states: 
If someone wished to express war it might be more elegant and 
literary to make a bow and arrow because that is more esthetic, 
but for me, if I want to express war, I'll use a machine-gun!' 
The  value of Guernica or Weeping Woman lies not in their con-
fronting us with searing, repellent violations of our standard con- 
cepts. Rather, their value lies centrally in their exploration of the 
vicious nature of grief and na r  respectively; which we can all rec- 
ognize and whose sheer raw poxver we should find discomforting, 
animalistic and repugnant. ICIoreover, the pleasure we feel does not 
just derive from the fact that the ug14; grotesque subject of the work 
is not a threat or open to our apprehension in el~eryday life. For in 
everyday life me sometimes do come across those unfortunate 
enough to be deformed, horrific conflicts or vicious forms of grief 
upon which, rather unfortunately, people are inclined to dwell. No 
' Picasso as quoted in a conversation on Guernica recorded by Jermoe 
Seckler in 1945 excerpted in Herschel B. Chipp (ed.), Theories of IWodern 
Art (Berkley: C'niversity of California Press, 1968). p. 488. 
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doubt we are all familiar with the fact that pedestrians and traffic 
habitually slow down to take a good look at some unfortunate acci- 
dent victim. The cognitivist account fails not only to recognize that 
we may enjoy and savour the fundamentally repugnant, ugly and 
incoherent in art but, just as significantly, that some do so in their 
everyday lives. 
The  cognitivist response fails to hit the target. Even though part 
of the reason grotesquery, ugliness and incoherence are valued in art 
concerns their relation to our categorial schemes, this cannot be the 
tl-hole story. For many people just do delight in the presentation of 
the grotesque, ugly or incoherent features themselves. Hence the 
appeal of the Grotesque O l d  IVoman, after Quentin Massys, c. 1520, 
to be found in the National Gallery, London, or Christian Schad's 
depiction of Agosta the Pigeon-chested iWan and Rasha  the Black 
Doce ,  displayed in the Royal Academy's German Art in the 
Twentieth Century exhibition. If a beautiful, coherent, non-
grotesque and elegant subject and artistic means could be found to 
express the same attitudes a work would not necessarily be better, as 
it would have to be according to the cognitivist. If U n  Chien 
Andnlou expressed the same point, the possible incoherence of the 
world, but was edited in such a nay that it did so coherently and 
devoid of horrific images, Ive would have lost rather than improved 
the work's value 
Of course, perhaps a certain attitude or disposition is required to 
delight in such features. One might even think that those who are 
petrified by the possible meaninglessness of the world will be 
unable, psychologically speaking, to cope with attending to works 
and features which manifest this possibility or delight in it. But the 
fundamental point is that we do not value ugliness, grotesquery or 
incoherence in the examples cited merely because they are taken to 
represent an attitude. For those who value them, the works and their 
typically repellent features are delighted in and savoured. Thus we 
can make sense of the complaint, made of a portrait of a grotesque, 
Dada piece or a punk rock track, that it is just not ugly, repugnant 
or incoherent enough. 
V: Relational Value 
4 different response would be to claim that although we do delight 
in the sound or look of features such as ugliness or incoherence it is 
only by virtue of their relation to other features of a work or other 
artistic movements. Consider the following quotation from 
Shakespeare's Twelfth Aright: 
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O! what a deal of scorn looks beautiful 
In the contempt and anger of his lip." 
Part of the point of Shakespeare's lines is precisely that the nor- 
mally distorted and horrific features of scorn and contempt them- 
selves become beautiful and pleasurable to dwell upon when mani- 
fested in the features of one who is both beautiful and beloved. 
Thus  what is normally repellent and harsh to look upon maq: given 
a certain context and relation to other features, become beautiful 
and pleasing. So, following Sible?; it may be claimed that the aes- 
thetic value of features such as ugliness and incoherence may be, 
properly speaking, relational and wholly context dependent rather 
than being, as is the case with beaut); of autonomous aesthetic 
value." Take aTvay the relation and ive would not savour these fea- 
tures at all. For example, the deliberate incoherence and ugliness of 
punk rock or Stockhausen were valued in contrast to ~vha t  had gone 
before. Xamely, a highly polished structural coherence and de\,el- 
opment of themes and harmonies which seemed too slick and 
empty. Thus,  in contrast to the formal elegance and beauty of prior 
music forms, punk and Stockhausen were enjoyed precisely because 
they xvere not polished, slick or finished but grating, raw and appar- 
ently uncontrolled. 
It is a general feature of our understanding of art that it is neces- 
sarily comparative.'" Our understanding of the nature and point of 
an artwork depends not just on attending to a work in isolation but, 
necessarily, to its place in an artist's oeuvre as a whole, the relation 
of the artist to a particular mo\-enlent and the relation between the 
movement to lvhich he belongs and the movements he conceives 
himself to be reacting to; lvhether it be in terms of repeating, 
extending or repudiating particular artistic traditions. A work's 
artistic value is intelligible if and only if \ve grasp its various rela- 
tions to the works and movements that preceded it. 
Consider once more the Dada art movement. Only in the light of 
a classical art tradition and attempts to capture the essential, 
unchanging, eternal values of art which reasserted itself after the 
catastrophe of ITorld \Tar I ,  with which the avant garde's glorifica- 
tion of n-ar and machine aestheticism had been associated, can lve 
make sense of the assault attempted by Dada on the cultural prac- 
tice of art. Only given the predominant classical conception of art 
"Shakespeare, Tzcelfth Sight (1601), Act 3, Section 1, 1. 159. 
Frank Sibley, 'Aesthetic Concepts',  Plzilosopltical Reciezc, h l .  68, 
1959, pp. 421-450. 
'I '  See David Hume's essay. 'Of the Standard of Taste' in his Selected 
Essays (Oxford University Press, 1993), S.  Copley and A. Edgar (eds), pp. 
133-1 54. 
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can we make sense of Marcel Duchamp's readymades as a jokey 
attempt to refute the presumption that good art must manifest an 
essential property or transcendent value. Only in the light of a rea- 
soned, traditional conception of art do the essentially irrationalist 
and deconstructive techniques of Dada make any sense. For if the 
classical tradition had not existed prior to Dada then far from con- 
stituting an art movement what was produced would, in the most 
literal sense, have been nonsense. Similarly, only in the light of a 
great classical tradition stretching from Monteverdi through 
Mozart and Beethoven to Elgar, does the music of John Cage or 
Stockhausen make any sense. For such movements are essentially 
negative in a deep sense; they are essentially repudiations of the 
artistic traditions that had evolved and developed pre\~iously over 
many ages. Take away the tradition that is being repudiated and 
such music or art makes no sense. 
On this story, then, features such as ugliness and incoherence may 
possess intrinsic aesthetic value but, unlike beauty, this value is only 
parasitic. Their value is wholly supervenient on their relations to 
and the negative evaluation of other works and artistic traditions. 
Take away the prior works and traditions and the relation to what is 
being repudiated disappears and, consequentl\; what merits the 
works have would vanish. Hence, one might suggest, punk music 
died a predictable death once popular music became vital once more 
instead of slickly pursuing empty disco formulas. RJoreover, for 
those who continue to delight in the classical tradition, the appeal of 
Cage and Stockhausen remains deeply puzzling and unintelligible. 
The  point is that features such as ugliness and incoherence may 
have an intrinsic aesthetic value only in certain contexts; where such 
features are used to react negatively against other artistic traditions. 
But beauty and coherence, by contrast, have an independent aes- 
thetic value which is not reducible to particular contexts and rela- 
tions, though what makes something beautiful may \\ell be context 
dependent. 
VI: Freakish Delights 
Konetheless, although an appreciation of artistic traditions is 
required to understand how certain ~vorks or artistic movements 
came about, and thus grasp a large part of their value, it cannot be 
the whole truth. For in the case of Stockhausen, Un Chien Andalou 
and the portrayal of grotesques, we do consider the ugly and inco- 
herent features of the work to possess a certain positive aesthetic 
worth, independently of their relation to and our negative evalua- 
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tion of other works or artistic movements. Hence, for example, we 
might like both soul music, Elgar or Hollywood films and the kind 
of works typified by punk, Stockhausen's music or Un Chien 
Andalou. 
Of course, part of the value of the ugliness and incoherence man- 
ifest in representational works which bear these features lies in their 
artistic rendering and the oscillation between the work and what it 
depicts. Moreover, part of the enjoyment of these features arises 
from a contrast between the way the artistic object is and the way it 
could have been. For example, Un Chien Andalou works precisely 
because it sets up all sorts of expectations and then proceeds to frus- 
trate them at every conceivable turn. The  characters change, just as 
a narrative line suggests itself it is cut off, the images clash and so 
on. Similarly, part of the attraction of grotesques lies in the very 
disjunction between what, had they been normal they would have 
been like, and the distorted, corrupted, freakish physiognomies we 
see before us. We look at what is presented to us and value it at the 
meta-level for its frustration of our expectations and the oscillation 
between what we see or hear and ~vha t  we would normally expect 
such works or people to be like." 
Yet the attraction cannot entirely rest at the meta-level. For we 
may just delight in and savour what is ugly and incoherent, which 
ties in with a certain kind of human fascination for the freakish or 
horrific. Indeed, consider Leontion's story as recounted by Plato in 
The Republic: 
he noticed some corpses lying on the ground with the execution- 
er standing by them. He  wanted to go and look at them, and yet 
at the same time held himself back in disgust. For a time he 
struggled and covered his eyes, but at last his desire got the bet- 
ter of him and he ran up to the corpses, opening his eyes and say- 
ing to them, 'There you are, curse you,-a loeely sight! Have a 
real good look."' 
Th e  point is that Leontion's delighting in the corpses, analogous to 
punk's delight in complete ugliness or incoherence in both style and 
music, suggest that it is the grotesque features which are themselves 
delighted in. Of course, one might hold that it is a purely contin- 
gent matter as to whether people actually savour intrinsically 
I' This kind of line is suggested by Jerrold Lei-inson, 'Pleasure and the 
Value of [Vorks of Art', Bvitish Journal of Aesthetics,  Vol. 3 2 ,  No. 4, 1992, 
p. 300. 
l 2  Plato, T h e  Republic, trans. D. Lee, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 
2nd edn, Book I\: pp. 215-216, 1. 439e-1.140a. The  italics are my own, to 
emphasize that Leontion delights in the sight of the corpses. 
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unpleasant features such as ugliness." The  thought is that it is not 
the intrinsically unpleasant features and our subsequently unpleas- 
ant response that are delighted in but, rather, only the features of 
the object which give rise to an unpleasant, unsavoured response. 
Recognizing that delighting in the grotesque, ugly and incoherent 
may be aesthetically rewarding does not entail that what is ugly, 
grotesque or incoherent is a contingent matter. For there are certain 
ideal human standards by virtue of which it is appropriate to derive 
pleasure from certain things and be repelled by others.I4 Certain 
tastes or sensations are pleasurable under certain standard and nor- 
mative human conditions. In normal cases where someone fails, say, 
to delight in quenching their thirst or in being reunited with a 
friend we look for an explanation. If the failure to derive pleasure 
from such cases is beyond the standard limits of taste or desire vari- 
ation, then it must be explained in terms of the subject's divergence 
from our norms of desire. However, in secondary cases, where we 
can inhibit or modify the standard conditions through interference 
or convention, then sensations which are typically unpleasant may 
become pleasant and vice versa. Thus,  a delight in our reponses to 
ugliness, incoherence and the grotesque may constitutively include 
negative or positive evaluative thoughts and are individuated 
according to their formal object. 
Ugliness, incoherence and grotesquery which give rise to a 
response of disgust may intrinsically afford great pleasure, though 
we might evaluate them as undesireable.15 For we may delight in 
what we (ought to) desire not to desire.I6 The  attractions of activi- 
ties such as sado-masochism are not reducible to the controlled rit- 
ualistic role play which enables people to engage in and enjoy activ- 
ities that, outside such a controlled artificial context, would both be 
highly dangerous and socially threatening. The  fact is that such 
activities are pursued because they focus upon and afford a pleasur- 
able delight, which is savoured, in the infliction of pain and brutal- 
ity. But such a delight is intrinsically perverse since our evaluation 
I' See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as M a k e  Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 257, and Alex Neill, 'On a Paradox of 
the Heart', Philosophical Studies ,  \'ol. 65, 1992, pp. 53-65. 
" See Alasdair MacIntyre's 'Pleasure as a Reason for Action' in his 
Against the Sel f  Images of the Age  (London: Duckworth, 1971), pp. 
173-1 90. 
See Berys Gaut, 'The  Paradox of Horror', Brit ish Journal of 
Aesthetics, 1'01. 33, No. 4, 1993, pp. 339-344, makes this point in relation 
to our enjoyment of fearful and horrific fictions. 
'"ee David Lewis, 'Dispositional Theories of Value', Aristotelian 
Society S z ~ p p l .  Vol. ,  Vol. LXII I ,  1989, pp. 113-137. 
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of such a delight resulting from a perverse desire ought to be nega- 
tive: we ought to be ashamed of desiring and delighting in the 
painful, the brutal and the downright dangerous. Indeed, if some-
one were not only to take delight in such activities but evaluate them 
positively, then we would take this as a mark of a perverse charac- 
ter. 
As I have argued ugly, incoherent and grotesque artworks can and 
sometimes do afford us aesthetic pleasure. Hence from Bacon's bru- 
tal vision of the human condition through Picasso's searing depic- 
tion of grief to Serrano's Piss Christ, Stockhausen or punk rock we 
can appreciate why many people appropriately consider them to 
possess aesthetic value. Typically unpleasant features, characters or 
states of affairs may be of aesthetic value and cannot be wholly 
explained away as unfortunate by-products of something else we 
derive pleasure from. Rather they may afford pleasure, at least to 
those with an aesthetic sensibility directed toward the chaotic, ugly 
and incoherent, in attending to them. So the standard account of 
aesthetic value holds good but only if we are careful to distinguish, 
as too many people often fail to do, between aesthetic and artistic 
value. 
Hence it makes sense to complain that a punk's outfit is not inco- 
herent enough, that the grotesque depicted in a portrait is not ugly 
enough or that Un Chien Andalou could have been more fractured. 
Moreover, we do not delight in these appearances merely because 
they confirm our responses as appropriate. Leontion does not thrill 
to the sight of the corpses merely because it confirms to him that he 
is the kind of person who is afraid of death. For Leontion's pleasure 
is not dependent upon him refraining from looking at the corpses 
but rather precisely in his dwelling upon them. The  very sight of 
the distorted, dehumanized corpses is an essential part of the 
delight he takes in his enjoyment of looking upon them. Such 
unpleasant sights themselves can actually afford us a peculiar kind 
of aesthetic pleasure. 
Of course we may need to have a certain attitude or disposition in 
order to take delight in the ugly, grotesque or incoherent. I think 
this is certainly true of much post-modern and nihilistic art, which 
places primary aesthetic value on the chaotic, incoherent and 
grotesque, certainly above and beyond formal elegance, grace and 
unity. Hence the aesthetic value here is perhaps best captured in 
terms of Kant's dependent beauty. But in so far as Kant's contrast 
between free and dependent beauty is meaningful, not all the 
delight we take in ugliness and incoherence is dependent.'' 
" Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. J. C. Meredith, 
(Oxford University Press, 1951), Book 1, Section 16, pp. 72-74. 
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Sometimes, we just do delight in the appearance of ugliness. For 
example, in Yorkshire there is a great tradition of gurning. Gurning 
essentially involves competing to see who can pull the most distort- 
ed and ugly faces possible. Similarly, the pull of freak shows would 
be unintelligible if we did not derive pleasure from gazing on the 
ug14; grotesque and deformed. Thus,  atypically at least, we do 
derive pleasure from and delight in the grotesque, freakish or 
chaotic. 
What I have tried to show is that far from constituting counter 
examples to the traditional understanding of aesthetic value, if 
worked out carefully, ugliness and incoherence, contrary to first 
appearances, conform to it. What this points up, pace Beardsley et 
al, is the danger of deriving overall aesthetic principles of evalua- 
tion from the paradigmatic case of beauty. What we delight in, aes- 
thetically speaking, may be far from delightful. 
VII: Ethical Afterthoughts 
It  is important to point out that a perverse fascination for and 
delight in the freakish is, in a significant sense, perverse. Of course, 
it might be pointed out that art which confronts and pushes back the 
boundaries of our ethical and social taboos may be valuable in chal- 
lenging various prejudices. Thus  confronting the viewer with the 
ugly, the grotesque or incoherent may usefully challenge our com- 
fortable assumptions about normality, beauty and the ways in which 
we make sense of our world. 
But it is far from clear that pushing back the boundaries of our 
ethical and social presumptions, at least for its own sake, is a good 
thing at all. For the corrosion of our natural human bonds may lib- 
erate us, but liberation from the self-discipline of moral and social 
restraints upon the violent, ugly and brutish aspects of our animal 
natures is clearly a bad thing. What marks out human civilization, 
as distinct from animal behaviour, is precisely our self-conscious 
suppression and sublimation of our animal natures toward what is, 
humanly speaking, rational. Artworks which cultivate the delight in 
our baser non-rational appetites are thus humanly impoverishing 
and bad as art.18 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the preoccupation with inco- 
herence, violence and perverse pleasures in art tends to occur after 
''See hIatthew Kieran, 'The Impoverishment of Art ' ,  BritishJournal of 
Aesthetics, Vol. 35, No. 1 ,  1995, pp. 15-25, and 'Art, Imagination and the 
Cultivation of Morals', Journal of Aesthetics and A r t  Critirisnz, Vol. 54, 
S o .  3. Fall 1996. 
Matthew Kieran 
the apparent perfection of a form of a certain kind. For example, 
Jacobean drama's preoccupations are partly a result of the perfec- 
tion reached by Shakespearean tragedy; so there is nowhere left to 
go but down toward pandering to our more perverse pleasures." 
The  slide toward decadence is deeply interesting. But although aes- 
thetically valuing such things ma!- well be the mark of a juvenile or 
morally bad character, this is a separate matter from the question of- 
pure aesthetic value. 
Artistic value is broader than mere aesthetic value. TThen people 
object to something as obscene they are often not disputing that the 
work concerned has, or can be seen by some to have, aesthetic value. 
Rather what underlies the condemnation is the thought that though 
aesthetically attractive in a certain light, what is represented and 
how it is conveyed is morally repugnant. A morally or religiously 
obscene image is not denounced merely by virtue of the subject 
matter, but because the focus of interest is merely the particularities 
of the ugl?; repulsive medium used, for instance the urine in 
Andreas Serrano's Piss Christ, or the tedious, unimaginative con- 
centration upon the perennial repetition of images of violence and 
death, as in Damien Hirst, or images of sexual congress, as in the 
work of Jeff Koons, without any distinctively artistic achievement. 
I t  is interesting to consider in this light John Ruskin's thoughts on 
the late Renaissance in The Stones of Venice.Ruskin recognized that 
the art of the period was devoted to the pursuit of pleasure, which 
we would characterize as aesthetic, but did so only given a debased 
delight in brutal mocker); monstrosity and deformity at the expense 
of insight into or the transcendence of our human condition. Hence 
when describing a sculpture at the base of the touer dedicated to St. 
hlary the Beautiful Ruskin comments thus: 
A head,-huge, inhuman, and monstrous,-leering in bestial 
degradation, too foul to be either pictured or described ... in that 
head is embodied the type of evil spirit to which Venice \vas aban- 
doned in the fourth period of her decline.'" 
Ruskin is not disputing that, seen under a certain light, the sculp- 
ture may be aesthetically rewarding. Rather he is objecting to such 
things as 'evidences of a delight in the contemplation of bestial vice, 
and the expression of low sarcasm, \vhich is, I believe, the most 
hopeless state into which the human mind can fall.'" The  point is 
that we can give a story about the aesthetic appeal of such images, 
' ' I  This  example mas suggested to me by Roger 1Vhite. 
"' John Ruskin, T h e  Stones  of Vetzzce (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 
1874),Vol. 111, Chapter 111, Section XI: p. 121 .  
2 1  Ibid., Section X1'1, p. 121.  
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yet the kind of interest rewarded by this form of aesthetic attention 
is a perversion of art proper. Perhaps, as Robert Hughes has sug- 
gested, a large part of the story may be told in terms of the degen- 
eration of modern art coupled with an obsession with the external 
vagaries of fashion and the commercial m a r k e t p l a ~ e . ~ ~  What this 
does suggest is the extent to which, though producing aesthetically 
appealing works, such artists and much contemporary art has failed 
our culture. But this leads us into Plato's worry about the arts and 
that is a question that can only be addressed elsewhere." 
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